Category

Agent & MCP security: 29 tools compared

Agent and MCP security tools scan Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers before you connect them, sit between agents and tools as gateways, or watch agent behavior at runtime. They exist because an agent that reads a poisoned MCP tool description can call tools and move data its user never approved.

  • 29 tools
  • Last reviewed

Part of layer 7 in our AI security layers: Agent and tool access. 12 tools from other categories also cover this layer.

Executive summary

What it is
Scanners, gateways, runtime monitors and identity controls for AI agents that call tools, read data and take actions, including agents that connect to tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP).
The risk
An agent with broad tool access acts on whatever instructions reach it. Hidden instructions in a tool description or tool output can trigger calls the user never approved, which OWASP files under prompt injection and excessive agency.
What to buy or do
Limit each agent to the tools and scopes it needs and require human approval for high-impact actions. Then add an MCP scanner in development and a gateway that applies policy and logging to tool calls.

Quick picks

The highest Coverage Scores in this category. The score measures what each vendor documents publicly; it is not an endorsement and it does not measure detection quality.

Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted

Scans skills and MCP servers, inspects agent tool calls and keeps an audit trail around AI coding agents.

Best for: Security teams that want scanning, guardrails and an audit trail around the coding agents developers already run, starting in observe mode before anything is blocked

Coverage Score 76 out of 100
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency

Reviewed

Open sourceMIT
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted

Proxies AI clients to MCP servers it runs as isolated Docker containers, with tool filters and call logs.

Best for: Developers and platform teams that already use Docker and want MCP servers to run in containers behind one gateway with per-server tool selection

Coverage Score 72 out of 100
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency

Reviewed

agentgateway

agentgateway (a Series of LF Projects, LLC)

Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
  • Cloud-native

Open-source proxy that applies auth, CEL policy and guardrails to LLM, MCP and agent-to-agent traffic.

Best for: Platform teams that want one open-source gateway in front of MCP servers and LLM providers, with token validation, CEL rules per MCP method and pluggable guardrails

Coverage Score 69 out of 100
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency

Reviewed

All 29 agent security tools

Sorted by Coverage Score within the category. Tools cross-listed from another category carry an "Also covers" label.

Also covers layer
Type
Deployment
OWASP risk
Pricing model

Showing 29 of 29 tools

Agent & MCP security: 29 tools compared
Tool Type Deployment Pricing model OWASP risks Coverage Score Last reviewed
DefenseClawCisco Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
76 out of 100
Docker MCP GatewayDocker Open sourceMIT
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
72 out of 100
agentgatewayagentgateway (a Series of LF Projects, LLC) Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
  • Cloud-native
Free
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
69 out of 100
NeuralTrustNeuralTrust Open sourceApache-2.0
  • SaaS
  • Self-hosted
  • On-prem
Freemium
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
68 out of 100
ContextForgeIBM Open sourceApache-2.0
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
64 out of 100
OpenShellNVIDIA Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
  • Cloud-native
Free
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
64 out of 100
Strands BoxAmazon Web Services Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
64 out of 100
AktoAkto Open sourceMIT
  • SaaS
  • Self-hosted
Contact sales
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
63 out of 100
MCP-ScanSnyk (Invariant Labs) Now Snyk Agent Scan Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
63 out of 100
Agent Governance ToolkitMicrosoft Open sourceMIT
  • Library
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
63 out of 100
Cisco MCP ScannerCisco Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library
  • API
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
61 out of 100
Cisco Skill ScannerCisco Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library
  • API
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
60 out of 100
Uber ADRUber Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
59 out of 100
Lasso MCP GatewayLasso Security Open sourceMIT
  • Self-hosted
  • CLI
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
57 out of 100
AgentCore PolicyAmazon Web Services Commercial
  • Managed service
  • Cloud-native
  • API
  • CLI
Usage-based
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
55 out of 100
Invariant GuardrailsSnyk (Invariant Labs) Open sourceApache-2.0
  • Library
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
54 out of 100
mcp-context-protectorTrail of Bits Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
Free
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
53 out of 100
Kubernetes Agent SandboxKubernetes SIG Apps Open sourceApache-2.0
  • Cloud-native
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
52 out of 100
Agent GatewayGoogle Cloud Commercial
  • Cloud-native
  • Managed service
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
50 out of 100
StraikerStraiker Commercial
  • SaaS
  • On-prem
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
49 out of 100
Pillar SecurityPillar Security Commercial
  • SaaS
  • Self-hosted
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
48 out of 100
Operant AIOperant AI Commercial
  • Cloud-native
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
39 out of 100
MCP Server PortalsCloudflare Commercial
  • SaaS
  • API
Not published
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
38 out of 100
ZenityZenity Commercial
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
35 out of 100
Oasis SecurityCyera (Oasis Security) Commercial
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
34 out of 100
Astrix AI Agent SecurityCisco (Astrix Security) Commercial
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
33 out of 100
Falcon GuardianCrowdStrike Commercial
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM01 Prompt Injection
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
31 out of 100
Veza AI Agent SecurityServiceNow (Veza) Commercial
  • SaaS
Not published
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
29 out of 100
Noma SecurityNoma Security Also covers Commercial
  • SaaS
  • On-prem
Not published
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM06 Excessive Agency
53 out of 100

OWASP LLM risks we weigh in this category

Risk coverage is 25 of 100 Coverage Score points. A tool earns them only for risks mapped to a capability the sources document.

How to choose

Choose by where the agent's risk sits. An agent that calls tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP) can be attacked through the tool descriptions it reads, the data its tools return and the permissions it holds. Products here work at different points: scanning servers before you connect them, gateways between agents and tools, runtime monitoring, and identity and permission controls.

Setup

  • Start with permissions. OWASP's guidance on excessive agency says to minimize the extensions an agent can call, avoid open-ended ones such as shell access, grant only the downstream permissions needed and require user approval for high-impact actions.
  • Scope tokens. The MCP specification's security best practices say servers must not accept tokens that were not issued for them (token passthrough) and recommend a minimal initial scope set, raised only when a privileged operation needs it.
  • Choose the risks. We weigh LLM01, LLM02, LLM05, LLM06 and LLM07 in this category.

Integration

  • Pick the enforcement point. Scanners check a server's tool definitions before use, gateways and proxies apply policy when a call is made, and runtime tools watch what an agent does.
  • Re-check tools over time. Invariant Labs describes tool poisoning as instructions hidden in tool descriptions that the model sees and the user does not, and a rug pull as a server changing a tool's description after the client approved it. Ask whether a scanner checks again after install.
  • Match the deployment to your workflow: a local developer tool, a CI step, a gateway or a hosted platform. The table lists each.
  • Screening the content of prompts and tool output belongs to the runtime guardrails layer; agents usually need both.

Limits

A scanner can flag suspicious tool descriptions, but it cannot make an over-permissioned agent safe. The protocol and the products around it change often, so re-check versions and documentation before you rely on a feature. Start with least privilege and human approval, then add tooling.

Agent security FAQ

What is MCP?

The Model Context Protocol is an open-source standard for connecting AI applications to external systems. Through it, an AI application can reach data sources such as files and databases, tools such as search engines, and workflows.

What is tool poisoning?

It means malicious instructions placed in an MCP tool's description. The model reads them, but the user usually does not see them, so the model may act on them. Invariant Labs describes it as a specialized form of indirect prompt injection.

What does an MCP gateway do?

It sits between agents and MCP servers, so it can apply policy, authentication and logging to tool calls in one place. Each product documents its own features, so check the capabilities on each tool page.

Which OWASP risks apply most to agents?

LLM06 Excessive Agency is the main one, together with LLM01 prompt injection, which can trigger unwanted tool calls. OWASP's guidance centers on minimizing tools and permissions and requiring human approval for high-impact actions.

How should MCP servers handle tokens?

The MCP security best practices page says a server must not accept tokens that were not explicitly issued for it, which rules out token passthrough. It also recommends a minimal initial scope set, with more scope requested only when an operation needs it.

Do MCP scanners find every malicious server?

No. A scanner checks what it can see, such as tool descriptions and configuration. It cannot promise that a server is safe, and a server can change after you scan it. Combine scanning with sandboxing and least privilege.

Sources & last reviewed

Last reviewed . We compile from the vendors' own public pages and repositories and we do not run the products. Source links open in a new tab. Found a mistake? Report a correction.

Cisco DefenseClaw (5 sources)
Docker MCP Gateway (3 sources)
agentgateway (3 sources)
NeuralTrust (4 sources)
IBM ContextForge (3 sources)
NVIDIA OpenShell (3 sources)
Strands Box (3 sources)
Akto (4 sources)
MCP-Scan (Snyk Agent Scan) (4 sources)
Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (4 sources)
Cisco MCP Scanner (3 sources)
Cisco Skill Scanner (3 sources)
Uber ADR (3 sources)
Lasso MCP Gateway (3 sources)
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Policy (4 sources)
Invariant Guardrails (4 sources)
mcp-context-protector (3 sources)
Kubernetes Agent Sandbox (3 sources)
Google Cloud Agent Gateway (2 sources)
Straiker (3 sources)
Pillar Security (1 sources)
Operant AI (1 sources)
Cloudflare MCP Server Portals (1 sources)
Zenity (3 sources)
Oasis Security (3 sources)
Astrix AI Agent Security (3 sources)
CrowdStrike Falcon Guardian (2 sources)
Veza AI Agent Security (2 sources)
Noma Security (2 sources)