Layer 1 of 8, Know what you run
Governance and risk: decide which AI uses are allowed and keep the evidence
This layer is the register, intake and approval workflow and risk assessment that record who owns each AI use, how its risk was judged and what evidence backs that decision.
Executive summary
- What it is
- This layer is the register, intake and approval workflow and risk assessment that record who owns each AI use, how its risk was judged and what evidence backs that decision.
- The risk
- AI that nobody approved or owns, risk decisions with no record and AI vendors nobody assessed. When a regulator, customer or auditor asks how an AI system was approved, there is nothing to show.
- What to buy or do
- Buy or extend an AI governance platform, often shared with privacy and compliance, and require intake and approval for every AI use case. Check which regulations each vendor states it maps; no platform makes you compliant.
Our analysis Our editorial model, not a standard: OWASP, MITRE and NIST did not create or endorse it. Layer placements are our analysis, based on documented capabilities. How the model works.
The question this layer answers
Which AI systems do we run, who approved them, what risk does each carry, and can we prove it?
Budget line
An AI governance, risk and compliance platform, often shared with privacy, legal and compliance.
What it protects against
Our analysis
- AI use nobody approved or owns
- Risk decisions with no record
- Regulatory and contract exposure from missing evidence
- Third-party AI vendors nobody assessed
- Staff over-trusting AI output because no policy or training says otherwise
Typical controls
Our analysis
- Use-case intake and approval workflow
- Register of AI systems, owners, data and vendors
- Risk assessment and tiering
- AI policy library and acceptable-use policy
- Mapping to the regulations and standards the vendor states it supports
- Evidence collection and audit reports
- Vendor AI risk assessment
- Staff training
How it maps to standards
Source states means the framework's own text names the control or outcome this layer delivers. Our analysis means we drew the link. OWASP LLM ids are the 2025 edition; the ATLAS hub holds the MITRE data version.
| Framework | Entry | Basis | Where the source says it | How it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | Source states | Prevention list | Clear policies on data retention and use, and teaching users what not to enter. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM03 Supply Chain | Source states | Prevention list | Vetting data sources and suppliers with their terms, and auditing licenses on a schedule. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning | Source states | Prevention list | Vetting data vendors. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM06 Excessive Agency | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Approval workflows decide which agent uses need human sign-off. OWASP names human approval as an application control, not a governance workflow. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM09 Misinformation | Source states | Prevention list | Human review for critical content, telling users the limits of AI output, and training users. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI08 Cascading Failures (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM04, LLM06. | Our analysis | Related: description | Some risks stay unmitigated, and the enterprise must check that they are within its overall risk budget. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM05, LLM06, LLM09. | Source states | Mitigations 5, 8 | Training and assessment of the people who oversee agents. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.M0025 Maintain AI Dataset Provenance | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Registers that record datasets and their lineage support provenance. The control itself sits in layer 3. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0060 Publish Hallucinated Entities | Our analysis | Not named by the source | A policy for human review of AI output answers published hallucinated entities. |
| NIST AI RMF | GOVERN Govern (opens in a new tab) | Source states | GOVERN 1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 2.2, 6.1 | Legal and regulatory requirements documented, trustworthy AI in policy, an inventory of AI systems, AI risk training and policies for third-party AI risk. |
| NIST AI RMF | MAP Map (opens in a new tab) | Source states | MAP 1.1 | Intended purposes, uses and context-specific laws are documented, which is what a use-case intake collects. |
| NIST AI RMF | MANAGE Manage (opens in a new tab) | Source states | MANAGE 1.2 | Documented AI risks are prioritized by impact, likelihood and resources, which is what risk tiering does. |
Tools in this layer (7)
Tools whose category is AI governance, risk & compliance, listed by name. Compare them with Coverage Scores on the Governance hub.
AI Verify Foundation · open-source AI governance testing toolkit
103 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Mar 23, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0Credo AI · AI governance platform
CommercialHolistic AI · AI governance and testing platform
CommercialIBM · AI governance and model monitoring product
CommercialModelOp · AI governance and lifecycle platform
CommercialOneTrust · AI governance product
CommercialSaidot · AI governance platform
Commercial
Also cover this layer (0)
No tool from another category documents a capability in this layer today.
Gaps we can see
- Some governance platforms also describe runtime features. Their capabilities carry governance tags, which are not evidence for layers 5, 6 or 7, so we do not place those platforms there.
What this layer will not do
Governance records decisions; it does not enforce them. A register and an approved policy do not block a prompt, mask data or stop an agent, so each decision needs a control in layers 2 to 8. Registers filled in by hand go stale, which is why automated discovery (layer 2) should feed them. A regulatory mapping shows what the vendor says its templates cover, not that an organization meets the rule. Runtime features that some governance platforms sell, such as SDKs or gateway enforcement, are not placed in other layers here, because their tool files tag them as governance capabilities.
Skills and training
NIST AI RMF GOVERN 2.2 expects people who work with AI to receive AI risk management training for their duties. See the courses and certifications we list. They are not scored and sit outside the eight layers.
Related guides
Governance and risk FAQ
Does an AI governance platform make us compliant with the EU AI Act?
No tool makes an organization compliant. Governance platforms state which regulations and standards their templates and mappings cover, and each tool page shows that wording with its source. Compliance still rests on your own assessments, controls and evidence, so treat the vendor's mapping as a starting point and check it with your legal and compliance teams.
What does NIST AI RMF expect from this layer?
Source states: GOVERN 1.6 says mechanisms are in place to inventory AI systems, GOVERN 2.2 says personnel and partners receive AI risk management training, MAP 1.1 covers documenting intended purposes, uses and context-specific laws, and MANAGE 1.2 says treatment of documented AI risks is prioritized by impact, likelihood and available resources. Those are the register, training, intake and risk tiering controls on this page.
Why is governance layer 1?
Our analysis: the other layers use its outputs. Discovery checks the register against what runs in your accounts, testing and guardrails are sized by risk tier, and agent approvals follow the policy set here. NIST AI RMF calls GOVERN a cross-cutting function that is infused throughout AI risk management and enables the other functions.
Who usually owns the governance budget?
Our analysis: the platform is often shared with privacy, legal and compliance teams, while security takes part through vendor AI risk and the AI register. Agree who approves a new AI use case before you buy, because the approval workflow decides how the product is configured.
Framework sources & last reviewed
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (list page) (1 sources)
- genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10 checked
OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection (1 sources)
OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure (1 sources)
OWASP LLM03:2025 Supply Chain (1 sources)
OWASP LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning (1 sources)
OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency (1 sources)
OWASP LLM07:2025 System Prompt Leakage (1 sources)
OWASP LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses (1 sources)
OWASP LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption (1 sources)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (resource page) (1 sources)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 (PDF, December 2025) (1 sources)
- genai.owasp.org/download/52117 checked
MITRE ATLAS (ids and names from the published ATLAS data file, version 2026.09) (1 sources)
- atlas.mitre.org checked