OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2025

LLM04: Data and Model Poisoning

Data and model poisoning is an integrity attack: someone tampers with pre-training, fine-tuning or embedding data to plant vulnerabilities, backdoors or bias. The effects range from weaker performance and skewed or toxic output to harm in downstream systems.

  • Last reviewed

Data and Model Poisoning in more detail

OWASP says external and unverified data sources carry the highest risk. Shared and open-source models can also carry malicious code, such as unsafe pickle files that run when the file is loaded. A backdoor can stay dormant until a trigger activates it, which is why OWASP calls such a model a sleeper agent and why it is hard to find by testing alone. Tracking where data comes from, checking it at each stage and testing the model against adversarial techniques are the main defenses.

The risk and its name come from OWASP; the summary, examples and controls on this page are our plain-English reading of OWASP's page. Source: Source, checked October 21, 2026: genai.owasp.org (opens in a new tab)

How it shows up

  • Malicious training data skews the model's outputs, for example through split-view or frontrunning poisoning.
  • Harmful content is injected directly into a training or fine-tuning set.
  • Unverified data produces biased or wrong results that look like normal behavior.
  • A downloaded model file runs code when it is loaded.
  • A backdoor stays silent in testing and activates only on a trigger phrase.

Controls that reduce it

  • Track data origins and transformations with tools such as CycloneDX or an ML bill of materials.
  • Vet data vendors and check model outputs against trusted sources.
  • Sandbox access to unverified data and use anomaly detection to filter adversarial samples.
  • Use data version control to detect unauthorized changes.
  • Monitor training loss and model behavior against thresholds.
  • Red-team the model and test its robustness against adversarial techniques.

Controls reduce risk, they do not remove it

No single control covers data and model poisoning on its own. Combine controls, and treat any tool as one layer.

Categories that address it

Our analysis

These are the directory categories whose tools we score on this risk. The mapping is our analysis.

Layers that address this risk

Our AI security layers are an editorial model, not a standard. Source states means OWASP's own text for LLM04 names the control the layer delivers. Our analysis means we drew the link.

Tools mapped to LLM04

Our analysis

6 tools are mapped. Each tool is mapped only where a documented capability supports it. Open a tool page to see the capability and its source. Coverage Score compares tools within one category.

Tools mapped to LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
Tool Type Deployment Pricing model OWASP risks Coverage Score Last reviewed
ModelAuditOpenAI (Promptfoo) · Supply chain Open sourceMIT
  • CLI
  • Library
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
86 out of 100
ModelScanPalo Alto Networks (Protect AI) · Supply chain Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library
Free
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
84 out of 100
model-transparencySigstore · Supply chain Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library
Free
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
78 out of 100
HiddenLayer ScannerHiddenLayer · Supply chain Commercial
  • SaaS
  • Self-hosted
Not published
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
58 out of 100
ARTLF AI & Data Foundation · Red teaming Open sourceMIT
  • Library
  • Self-hosted
Free
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM10 Unbounded Consumption
55 out of 100
Prisma AIRSPalo Alto Networks · AI-SPM Commercial
  • SaaS
  • Cloud-native
  • API
Not published
  • LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning
44 out of 100
Why each tool is mapped
  • ModelAudit: The README says it looks for backdoor indicators in model files.
  • ModelScan: The README lists model poisoning and data poisoning among the outcomes of model serialization attacks it scans for.
  • model-transparency: Hash verification can reveal that model files were altered after signing; it does not detect poisoning before signing.
  • HiddenLayer Scanner: The vendor says it looks for backdoors and tampering in model files and weights.
  • ART: Includes poisoning attack modules for ML models; the docs do not describe LLM-specific use.
  • Prisma AIRS: The model scanner checks for hidden backdoors in model files.

Related reading

Sources & last reviewed

Last reviewed . We compile from the vendors' own public pages and repositories and we do not run the products. Source links open in a new tab. Found a mistake? Report a correction.

Drafted with AI assistance; facts checked against primary sources on October 21, 2026.