Layer 4 of 8, Secure what you build and buy
Testing and red teaming: attack your own AI on purpose, before and after release
This layer attacks and evaluates your own models, apps and agents on purpose, with scanners, generated and multi-turn attacks, evaluations and expert red teams, before release and after each change.
Executive summary
- What it is
- This layer attacks and evaluates your own models, apps and agents on purpose, with scanners, generated and multi-turn attacks, evaluations and expert red teams, before release and after each change.
- The risk
- Prompt injection, data leakage, system prompt extraction and agent tool abuse that nobody looked for until an attacker did, plus third-party models whose behavior on your use case nobody checked.
- What to buy or do
- Run an open-source or commercial scanner in CI against every LLM app, block releases on regressions, and buy an expert or managed red team for high-risk agents. Map findings to OWASP ids so each fix reaches the right layer.
Our analysis Our editorial model, not a standard: OWASP, MITRE and NIST did not create or endorse it. Layer placements are our analysis, based on documented capabilities. How the model works.
The question this layer answers
Have we attacked this model, app or agent the way an adversary would, and do we repeat it after each change?
Budget line
AI red teaming tools or a managed red team service, usually in offensive security or application security testing; evaluation frameworks often sit with ML teams.
What it protects against
Our analysis
- Prompt injection and jailbreak weaknesses
- Data leakage and system prompt extraction
- Harmful or false output
- Agent tool abuse
- Regressions after model, prompt or tool changes
- Unverified behavior of third-party models
- Bias and fairness problems
Typical controls
Our analysis
- Automated vulnerability scans with probe libraries
- Generated and multi-turn attacks
- Agent and tool abuse tests
- Evaluation harnesses and benchmarks
- CI regression gates
- Reports mapped to frameworks
- Expert-led or managed red teaming
- Adversarial ML attacks on classic models
- Fairness and bias evaluations
How it maps to standards
Source states means the framework's own text names the control or outcome this layer delivers. Our analysis means we drew the link. OWASP LLM ids are the 2025 edition; the ATLAS hub holds the MITRE data version.
| Framework | Entry | Basis | Where the source says it | How it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM01 Prompt Injection | Source states | Prevention list | Run regular adversarial tests and treat the model as an untrusted user. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM03 Supply Chain | Source states | Prevention list | Red teaming and evaluations on third-party models for your own use cases. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning | Source states | Prevention list | Red-team the model against adversarial techniques. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Tools document probes for data leakage. OWASP's prevention list for this risk does not name testing. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM05 Improper Output Handling | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Testing can surface unsafe output reaching other systems. OWASP's prevention list for this risk does not name testing. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM06 Excessive Agency | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Tools document tests for agent tool abuse. OWASP names SAST and dynamic application testing in development pipelines (item 8), not adversarial testing of agent tool use. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM07 System Prompt Leakage | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Tools document probes for system prompt extraction. OWASP's prevention list for this risk does not name testing. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) | LLM09 Misinformation | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Tools document tests for false or misleading output. OWASP's prevention list for this risk does not name testing. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM06. | Source states | Mitigation 8 | Periodic red-team tests simulating goal override. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE) (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM05. | Source states | Mitigation 2 | Security evaluations and adversarial unit tests before production. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM04, LLM08. | Source states | Mitigation 7 | Adversarial tests, snapshots and rollback. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI08 Cascading Failures (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM01, LLM04, LLM06. | Source states | Mitigation 9 | Replay recorded agent actions in an isolated clone to check for cascades. |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) | ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (opens in a new tab) OWASP relates it to LLM06. | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Agent tool abuse tests. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0057 LLM Data Leakage | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API | Our analysis | Not named by the source | Red team tools emulate this technique. |
| NIST AI RMF | MEASURE Measure (opens in a new tab) | Source states | MEASURE 1.3, 2.7, 2.11 | MEASURE uses testing and assessment methods, with independent assessors (1.3), security and resilience evaluation (2.7) and fairness and bias evaluation (2.11). |
| NIST AI RMF | GOVERN Govern (opens in a new tab) | Source states | GOVERN 4.3 | Organizational practices enable AI testing. |
Tools in this layer (24)
Tools whose category is AI red teaming & LLM evaluation, listed by name. Compare them with Coverage Scores on the Red teaming hub.
Adversa AI · AI red teaming and agent security platform
CommercialAdversarial Robustness Toolbox
LF AI & Data Foundation · open-source adversarial machine learning library
6,283 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 8, 2026Open sourceMITZscaler (SPLX) · open-source scanner for agent workflows
1,058 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Nov 27, 2025Open sourceApache-2.0msoedov (open-source maintainer) · open-source LLM vulnerability scanner
2,024 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 19, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0AI Red Teaming Agent (Microsoft Foundry)
Microsoft · automated red teaming tool in Microsoft Foundry
CommercialPraetorian · open-source Go LLM vulnerability scanner
309 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 20, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0b3: Backbone Breaker Benchmark
Check Point (Lakera) and UK AI Security Institute · agent backbone LLM security benchmark
Open sourceMITConfident AI · open-source LLM red teaming framework
3,035 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 20, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0Anaconda (Enkrypt AI) · AI red teaming platform with guardrails
Commercial FreemiumPalo Alto Networks (CyberArk) · open-source LLM jailbreak fuzzer
1,587 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Feb 6, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0NVIDIA · open-source LLM vulnerability scanner
9,636 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 21, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0Giskard AI · open-source LLM agent testing library
5,916 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 20, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0 FreemiumGray Swan · AI red teaming and agent assessment platform
CommercialCenter for AI Safety · open-source red teaming benchmark
1,076 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Aug 16, 2024 inactiveOpen sourceMITUK AI Security Institute · open-source LLM evaluation framework
3,058 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 21, 2026Open sourceMITCheck Point (Lakera) · automated and expert AI red teaming offering
CommercialMindgard · AI red teaming platform
CommercialOpenAI (Promptfoo) · open-source LLM eval and red teaming tool
26,250 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 22, 2026Open sourceMIT Freemiumutkusen · open-source prompt injection scanner
1,288 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Dec 1, 2025Open sourceGPL-3.0Microsoft · open-source generative AI red teaming framework
4,668 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 22, 2026Open sourceMITRepello AI · autonomous AI red teaming platform
CommercialReversec · open-source prompt injection testing toolkit
268 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Sep 11, 2026Open sourceApache-2.0Zscaler (SPLX) · AI red teaming platform
CommercialQData · open-source NLP adversarial attack framework
3,475 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Aug 15, 2026Open sourceMIT
Also cover this layer (9)
Our analysis Tools from other categories that document a capability in this layer. Each row names the layer the tool belongs to first and the documented capability our placement rests on.
| Tool | Its primary layer | How it applies | Based on |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI Verify103 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Mar 23, 2026 | L1 Governance | Documents fairness and explainability tests for AI models, which is testing work. | Runs technical tests for fairness, explainability and robustness from a portal or the command line |
| Akto1,532 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 21, 2026 | L7 Agent access | Documents red teaming of AI agents and MCP servers with security probes for injection, tool abuse and privilege escalation. | Red teams AI agents and MCP servers with security probes aimed at prompt injection, tool abuse and privilege escalation |
| Holistic AI | L1 Governance | Documents automated bias and privacy tests for AI systems. | Automated tests for bias, robustness, privacy and transparency |
| IBM watsonx.governance | L1 Governance | Documents quality and fairness evaluations of AI models. | Evaluates machine learning models for quality, fairness and accuracy |
| ModelOp Center | L1 Governance | Documents automated bias, drift and performance tests on models. | Automated tests for bias, drift and performance |
| NeuralTrust15 GitHub stars as of Oct 21, 2026; last push Oct 21, 2026 | L7 Agent access | Documents TrustTest, which covers prompt injection, jailbreaks, data extraction and multi-turn agentic attacks. | TrustTest runs adversarial tests for prompt injection, jailbreaks, data extraction and multi-turn agentic attacks |
| Operant AI | L7 Agent access | Documents a red teaming command line tool for agents. | Publishes Woodpecker, a modular red teaming CLI for AI and cloud apps |
| Pillar Security | L7 Agent access | Documents multi-turn adversarial attacks on agents. | Runs multi-turn adversarial attacks with attack transcripts and reproduction steps |
| Straiker | L7 Agent access | Documents continuous red teaming of agents across tools, MCP servers and workflows. | Continuously red-teams agents across tools, MCP servers and workflows |
What this layer will not do
Testing finds weaknesses; it does not block them in production. A clean scan covers only the probes it ran, and OWASP's LLM01 page says it is unclear whether fool-proof prevention of prompt injection exists, so a pass shows only that those probes failed that day. Results go stale with every model, prompt or tool change. Benchmarks compare models on fixed datasets and do not replace tests against your own app, data and tools. Every finding needs a fix in another layer: a guardrail, a data control or a narrower agent permission.
Related guides
Testing and red teaming FAQ
How often should we red team an LLM app?
The OWASP LLM01 page lists adversarial testing and attack simulations as a prevention step without setting an interval, and the OWASP Agentic Top 10 asks for periodic red-team tests of goal override (ASI01). Our analysis: run automated scans in CI on every model, prompt or tool change, and schedule deeper expert or managed exercises for high-risk apps and agents.
What is the difference between an evaluation framework and a red teaming tool?
Our analysis: an evaluation framework measures how a model performs on a set of tasks or benchmarks and often sits with ML teams. A red teaming tool generates attacks such as injection, jailbreaks and data extraction against an app or agent and reports what got through. Both belong in this layer; each tool page says which jobs its sources document.
Which NIST AI RMF function does testing answer?
MEASURE. NIST describes it as using testing and assessment methods, and its subcategories include independent assessors (MEASURE 1.3), evaluating and documenting security and resilience (MEASURE 2.7) and evaluating fairness and bias (MEASURE 2.11). GOVERN 4.3 adds organizational practices that enable AI testing.
Framework sources & last reviewed
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (list page) (1 sources)
- genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10 checked
OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection (1 sources)
OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure (1 sources)
OWASP LLM03:2025 Supply Chain (1 sources)
OWASP LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning (1 sources)
OWASP LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency (1 sources)
OWASP LLM07:2025 System Prompt Leakage (1 sources)
OWASP LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses (1 sources)
OWASP LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption (1 sources)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (resource page) (1 sources)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 (PDF, December 2025) (1 sources)
- genai.owasp.org/download/52117 checked
MITRE ATLAS (ids and names from the published ATLAS data file, version 2026.09) (1 sources)
- atlas.mitre.org checked