Model & ML supply-chain security

Sigstore model-transparency (model-signing): open-source ML model signing tool

model-transparency is an open-source ML model signing tool from Sigstore. It is released under the Apache-2.0 license and is offered as: CLI, Library.

  • Last reviewed
Open sourceApache-2.0 Layer 3: Model and supply chain

Best for

  • Teams that publish or consume models and want a free way to sign model files and check signatures before loading them
  • Platform teams that want release pipelines to sign models with CI workload identities instead of managing signing keys

Ownership

The repository sits in the sigstore GitHub organization, and the address github.com/google/model-transparency now opens the same repository. No page we opened announces a move. Source, checked October 21, 2026: github.com (opens in a new tab)

Consider instead if

  • You want to scan model files for unsafe serialized code instead of proving who signed them. See ModelScan.
  • You want model weights stored in a format that cannot run code when loaded, whoever published them. See safetensors.

What model-transparency does

Most tools in the model supply chain category inspect a file for dangerous content. model-transparency answers a different question: is this the exact model its publisher released? It hashes every file of a model, signs that list, and lets a consumer recompute and compare before loading, with Sigstore as the default signer and private keys, certificates or PKCS #11 hardware as options. In a pipeline, a CI job can sign with its own workload identity on GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Google Cloud or Buildkite, so no long-lived key needs storing. The limit follows from the design: a model that was malicious before it was signed verifies cleanly, so pair it with a scanner such as ModelScan or a safe format such as safetensors. The last tagged release is v1.1.1 from October 2025, while commits continue.

This summary is our own wording of the sourced facts on this page.

Key facts

Each value links to the page that states it, with the date we checked it.

Ownership
The repository sits in the sigstore GitHub organization, and the address github.com/google/model-transparency now opens the same repository. No page we opened announces a move. Source, checked October 21, 2026: github.com (opens in a new tab)
Documentation
Not documented in the sources we checked
Attestations or disclosure
Vulnerability reports go to [email protected]; the Security Response Committee acknowledges them within 24 hours Source, checked October 21, 2026: github.com (opens in a new tab)

Capabilities

As documented by the vendor or project. The tag is our label from a controlled vocabulary.

Integrations

Where model-transparency fits in our AI security layers

Our analysis

Our editorial model, not a standard. The primary layer follows the category, except for tools whose main documented job is detection and response; other layers rest on a capability the sources document. How the model works.

AI security layers that model-transparency covers, with the role, how each applies and what it rests on
LayerRoleHow it appliesBased on
L3 Supply chain Model and supply chain Primary Check that models, datasets and AI components from outside are what they claim to be and do not run code or hide backdoors when loaded. Follows its category, Model & ML supply-chain security

OWASP LLM Top 10 mapping

Our analysis

The risk list is OWASP's (Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2025). The mapping is our analysis, and each row rests on a capability the sources document.

OWASP LLM risks mapped to model-transparency, with the capabilities each mapping rests on
RiskHow it appliesBased on
LLM03 Supply Chain Signing and verification let a consumer check that model files match what the publisher signed. Signs a model by recording the hashes of its files in a signed record; Verifies a signature and recomputes file hashes to detect tampering; Supports Sigstore signing, plus keys, certificates and PKCS #11 devices; Writes the signature as a Sigstore bundle whose DSSE envelope carries an in-toto statement, and handles whole files and file shards
LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning Hash verification can reveal that model files were altered after signing; it does not detect poisoning before signing. Verifies a signature and recomputes file hashes to detect tampering

Alternatives and related tools

More in Model & ML supply-chain security, ranked within the category by Coverage Score.

ModelAudit (Promptfoo)

OpenAI (Promptfoo)

Open sourceMIT
  • CLI
  • Library
  • Self-hosted

Scans model files for malicious code, backdoor indicators and unsafe operations without loading them.

Best for: Teams that want a free scanner covering many model and archive formats, with SARIF output for code scanning in CI

Coverage Score 86 out of 100
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning

Reviewed

ModelScan

Palo Alto Networks (Protect AI)

Open sourceApache-2.0
  • CLI
  • Library

Scans saved ML model files for unsafe serialized code before you load them, from a CLI or Python.

Best for: ML and platform teams that want a free scanner to check downloaded or internally produced model files before loading or deploying them

Coverage Score 84 out of 100
  • LLM03 Supply Chain
  • LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning

Reviewed

picklescan

Matthieu Maitre

Open sourceMIT
  • CLI
  • Library

Scans pickle files, PyTorch archives and Hugging Face repos from the command line for suspicious globals.

Best for: Teams that want a small free command-line scanner for pickle-based model files, including checks of Hugging Face repositories before download

Coverage Score 73 out of 100
  • LLM03 Supply Chain

Reviewed

model-transparency FAQ

Is Sigstore model-transparency open source?

Yes. It is released under the Apache-2.0 license, and the code is on GitHub at sigstore/model-transparency.

Does model-transparency scan models for malware?

No. The README describes signing and verification of model files to detect tampering, not scanning for malicious content.

How does it sign a model?

The README says it records a hash of each model file in a signed record. Sigstore is the default signing method, and keys, certificates and PKCS #11 devices are also supported.

What does a valid signature prove?

That the model files match, hash for hash, what the signer signed, and who the signer was. It says nothing about whether the model was safe at signing time, so a scanner such as ModelScan or a safe format such as safetensors still has a job.

Key facts you can cite

We have no commercial relationship with Sigstore.

Sources & last reviewed

Last reviewed . We compile from the vendors' own public pages and repositories and we do not run the products. Source links open in a new tab. Found a mistake? Report a correction.